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o. "n August 5, the U.S. Senate cleared
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993 (OBRA93), one day after the
House of Representatives had done like-
wise. President Clinton signed the bill
into law on August 10, formalizing its
role as the central fiscal blueprint for the
nation's economy over the next five years.
Passage of OBRA93 followed an ex-
tended period of vigorous debate insti-
gated by the administration's publication
of A Vision of Change for America
(henceforth referred to as Vision) and the
President's State of the Union address in
February. In an earlier Economic Com-
mentary, we published an overview of
the administration's proposals.
1 Our pri-
mary conclusions were as follows:
• The majority of proposed deficit cuts,
in dollar terms, would be deferred to
the later years of the plan, with 70 per-
cent of the total being realized in fis-
cal years (FY) 1997-98.
• Through FY 1995, planned revenue
increases would actually exceed
deficit cuts and would cumulatively
account for 75 percent of the total
dollar reduction in deficits over the
entire six-year horizon.
• The plan would shift resources, via
both expenditure and tax policy, to-
ward nondefense discretionary
spending.
• The plan would reduce the net pay-
ment burden of future generations.
Although OBRA93 retained much of
the President's original plan, some of
our conclusions are indeed altered by
the provisions in the final budget bill.
In this article, we summarize those dif-
ferences and outline the legislation's
revenue, spending, and deficit details.
Using recently published data by the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO),
we conclude that:
• Compared to the Clinton plan,
OBRA93 provides more deficit re-
duction over its first three years, in
both absolute terms and as a per-
centage of the FY 1994-98 total.
However, it remains true that the
majority of cuts in dollar terms (60
percent) is deferred to FY1997 and
FY1998.
• Revenue increases are still the largest
source of deficit reduction, but ac-
count for only 56 percent of the total
in OBRA93, as opposed to more than
70 percent in the administration's
original proposal. Furthermore, un-
like the Clinton plan, in no year does
the bill entail revenue increases that
exceed that year's dollar amount of
deficit reduction.
• OBRA93, like the Clinton plan, does
provide for a rise in total nonde-
fense discretionary spending.
• Although reduced health benefits, tax-
ation of Social Security benefits, and
higher income taxes raise the net tax
burdens of all living generations, over
the immediate horizon the increases
are larger for older generations.
2
The final budget bill that was enacted
this past summer contains some sig-
nificant differences from the admini-
stration's original proposals. These
involve the scope and timing of deficit
reductions and the amount and distri-
bution of revenue increases. Here, the
authors use new data from both the
Congressional Budget Office and the
Office of Management and Budget to
assess changes in lifetime tax burdens
created by the new legislation and to
explore prospects for real deficit re-
duction in the budget bill.
• The Bottom Line
The analysis here and in the following
two sections relies largely on numbers
produced by the CBO. These estimates
differ from the administration's, which
are produced by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB), for a variety
of technical reasons. The most impor-
tant of these for our purposes is the
exclusion of spending reductions man-
dated by prior legislation. Specifically,
the CBO does not allocate to OBRA93
spending cuts that are required by the
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990—a
position that we find appropriate.3
The CBO calculates that from FY1994
through FY1998, the budget bill is
projected to reduce deficits by a cumu-
lative total of $433 billion below what
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TABLE 1 EFFECTS OF OBRA93 TAX CHANGES
BY INCOME GROUP
































they otherwise would have been. Figure
1 provides a first sense of how deficit
reduction in OBRA93 compares to the
administration's original proposals. As
illustrated, the CBO foresees deeper
cuts from the final legislation than it
projected under the President's plan
when it was announced in February, a
feature that is true both cumulatively
and in each of the relevant fiscal years.
Although some of the difference is due
to changes in economic and technical
conditions since March (the date of the
CBO's analysis of the Clinton plan),
most is the result of shifts in policy.
Changes in the relative timing of defi-
cit reduction are also apparent from fig-
ure 1. In particular, a larger fraction of
the OBRA93 deficit cuts is to be real-
ized in the early years of the legislation
than was the case in the administra-
tion's proposal. Nonetheless, the bill
still postpones the majority of cuts to
the outlying years of the budget: A full
A Closer Look at the Revenue Side
Increased revenues account for nearly
56 percent of the $433 billion deficit re-
duction total. This is substantially lower
than the 70 percent share proposed by
the administration, because OBRA93
reflects both larger spending cuts and
lower revenue collections. The most
significant element of the latter arises
from a scaling back of the President's
initial energy tax proposals.
The distribution of total revenue in-
creases in the new legislation is illus-
trated in figure 2. Approximately 58
percent of the total is associated with
taxes aimed at high-income individu-
als, including both higher income-tax
rates and Medicare payroll taxes. How-
ever, as shown in table 1, the CBO cal-
culates that the majority of taxpayers
(starting with a family income of
$30,000) will face somewhat greater
tax burdens than before. In addition,
the tax changes have long-run distribu-
tional effects that are not adequately
captured by simply looking at the point-
in-time impact across income levels, a
subject we will discuss later.
A Closer Look at the Outlay Side
Like the Clinton plan before it, OBRA93
seeks simultaneously to reduce total fed-
eral outlays and to shift spending priori-
ties (see figure 3). Assuming that planned
defense cuts follow the proposals in
Vision, total outlays for nondefense dis-
cretionary spending will, relative to the
old status quo, be higher in all years but
FY1998. However, over five years, the
legislation calls for a nearly $70 billion
decline in overall discretionary expendi-
tures, a total guaranteed by legislated
spending caps that are binding unless spe-
cifically abrogated by acts of Congress.
The balance of OBRA93's $192 billion
spending reductions stems from a de-
cline in planned mandatory and interest
expenditures. These changes — particu-
larly in mandatory spending — have a
significant impact on the generational
burden of the plan, an issue to which
we now turn.FIGURE 2 DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE INCREASES
BY SOURCE IN OBRA93, FY1994-98
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
Lifetime Tax Rates
Table 2 presents lifetime tax rates un-
der both baseline and OBRA93 poli-
cies. The table indicates a consistent
increase over time: Generations born in
the early 1900s faced lifetime tax rates
in the range of 20 to 25 percent of life-
time labor earnings, while generations
born in the 1990s, if treated as indi-
cated under baseline policies, would
face rates just under 34 percent. Most
disturbing, however, is the fact that un-
der baseline policies, generations born
after 1991 are estimated to face life-
time tax rates of more than 70 percent,
on average. This severe imbalance in
the status quo fiscal policy reflects a
surge in projected entitlement spending
by way of Social Security, Medicare,
and Medicaid, together with an in-
crease in the number of elderly recipi-
ents of these benefits.
• OBRA93 from a Generational
Accounting Perspective
As noted, OBRA93 aims to achieve its
five-year, $433 billion deficit reduction
through a mixture of tax increases and
spending cuts. Although the foregoing
discussion provides some insight into
the law's distributional effects, it does
not address the long-run impact on dif-
ferent generations of taxpayers and
benefit recipients. In particular, we
would like to understand the likely im-
pact of the bill's measures on the net
tax burdens — tax payments less trans-
fer receipts (such as Social Security
and Medicare benefits) — of individu-
als in different age groups.
Our approach is to estimate the present
value of changes in prospective net tax
payments for different generations un-
der the assumption that the policies em-
bodied in the legislation will be in
force permanently. This type of analy-
sis reveals the stance of budgetary
measures with regard to intergenera-
tional wealth redistribution.
We presented the results of such an ex-
ercise, based on the budget proposals
contained in Vision, in our earlier Eco-
nomic Commentary. In fact, from the
perspective of generational accounting,
OBRA93 differs little from the original
administration proposals, and we reach
essentially the same conclusions that
we did before: OBRA93, if sustained
over time, will increase the prospective
net tax burdens on living generations
and reduce the lifetime tax burdens on
future generations. However, the meas-
ures in the new legislation do not go as
far as necessary to redress the imbal-
ance in current fiscal policy, whereby
future generations face lifetime tax bur-
dens that are considerably higher than
those faced by today's newborns.
Here, we supplement the results of the
earlier study by offering two alternative
ways of viewing the effects of OBRA93
on living and future generations. First,
we present lifetime tax rates — the pres-
ent value of taxes less transfers relative to
lifetime income — faced by selected gen-
erations. Our experiments compare these
rates in the baseline, or status quo, case
involving no policy change to those im-
plied by the assumption that OBRA93
policies will be in force permanently.
Second, we relax the assumption that the
OBRA93 policies are permanent, and
trace the changes in tax and transfer
flows on individuals of different ages over
the five years of the budget plan only.
Table 2 also illustrates our earlier obser-
vation that the generational effects of
the proposals presented in Vision were
not changed significantly by the various
modifications that yielded OBRA93.
7
Like the initial plan, the final legislation
imposes fairly modest increases in the life-
time tax rates on most living generations.
The largest increases are imposed on the
relatively younger generations. This is not
surprising, because these individuals have
the greater part of their earning and tax-
paying years ahead of them and will there-
fore pay higher taxes for a longer period
of time. Despite the small rise in tax rates
implied by the tax and spending changes
in OBRA93, the reduction in the average
lifetime tax rate faced by future genera-
tions is a sizable 13 percent. The new life-
time tax rate of future generations is
still quite large, however, meaning that
OBRA93, like the Clinton plan before
it, represents only a small step toward
equalizing the lifetime tax burdens of
living and future generations.
Per Capita Tax and Transfer
Flows — FY1994-98
The assumption that the policies em-
bodied in OBRA93 will be in force per-
manently is an extreme one, and changes
are certain to occur in the course of fu-


































1994 1995 1997 1996
Fiscal year
SOURCES: Congressional Budget Office and Office of Management and Budget.
1998
higher taxation of Social Security bene-
ficiaries translate into sizable increases
in the net tax burdens per capita for
older male and female generations,
while higher income taxes impose sig-
nificant burdens on young and middle-
aged male generations.
On a per capita basis, these tax and
transfer changes suggest that per capita
increases in burdens are larger for
older individuals. However, to the ex-
tent that policies under OBRA93 are con-
tinued beyond 1998—and in view of
the pressures for higher taxes that will
undoubtedly emerge as a result of the
imbalance in the nation's fiscal poli-
cies—young and middle-aged genera-
tions are likely to face future tax bur-
dens that are much larger than those
indicated in the figures.






























































a. Authors' calculations based on Budget Baselines, Historical Data, and Alternatives for the Future, Office
of Management and Budget, January 1993.
b. Authors' calculations based on A Vision of Change for America, February 1993.
c. Authors' calculations based on Mid-Session Review of the 1994 Budget, Office of Management and Budget.
more instructive to consider the genera-
tional impact of OBRA93 only up to
the last year that the legislation is in
force (1998). We now shift our focus
from lifetime tax rates to estimates of
the annual per capita taxes and transfers
implied by the legislation over the next
several years.
Figures 4 and 5 depict the change in an-
nual payments for the most important
categories of taxes and transfers for se-
lected generations from FY1994
through FY1998.
8 The data confirm
the earlier discussion that most of the
cuts are to occur in FY 1997-98. The re-
ductions in health benefits and the
• Deja Vu All Over Again?
During the Bush administration. Con-
gress passed the Omnibus Reconciliation
Act of 1990 (OBRA90), legislation that
proposed a five-year deficit reduction of
about $500 billion, raised fuel taxes by
about a nickel per gallon, increased mar-
ginal tax rates on high-income individu-
als, placed caps on discretionary spend-
ing, and restricted Medicare outlays,
among other things. The deficit — in
nominal terms, in real terms, and relative
to GDP — rose in each of the two fiscal
years following OBRA90's passage. The
CBO's projections as of August put the
FY 1993 deficit at about $266 billion,
nearly $40 billion higher than the
FY1990 deficit, and still a larger percent-
age of GDP than prevailed at the time
OBRA90 was signed into law.
Many economists and policymakers
point to extraordinary factors — presum-
ably unrelated to the provisions of the
budget bill itself—that have unfortu-
nately conspired against the progress to-
ward deficit reduction for which the pro-
ponents of OBRA90 had hoped. Chief
among these are the recession that began
in the summer of 1990 and the unusually































Authors' calculations based on Mid-Session Review of the 1994 Budget. Office of Management and Budget. September 1993.
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a. Ages as of 1993.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on Mid-Session Review of the 1994 Budget, Office of Management and Budget, September 1993.
1998
An alternative explanation, however,
appeals to traditional supply-side criti-
cisms of raising marginal tax rates to
combat deficits. The essence of these
arguments is that the failure of govern-
ment estimates to incorporate behav-
ioral responses to tax changes causes
official revenue projections to be
grossly overstated. For instance, econo-
mists Martin Feldstein and Daniel
Feenberg estimate that tax avoidance in
the face of OBRA93's tax rate in-
creases will cause income tax revenues
to be about $20 billion less than the ad-
ministration has claimed. Preliminary
calculations performed by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland's research
staff suggest that labor supply and sav-
ing responses could result in shortfalls
of a similar magnitude.
In fact, the post-OBRA90 period pro-
vides something of a natural experi-
ment for these supply-side arguments,
and the evidence is not encouraging for
deficit reduction prospects. Federal tax
revenues in 1991 and 1992 were more
than $130 billion less than the CBO in-
itially projected following passage of
that legislation, and less than 60 per-
cent of this shortfall can be directly ac-
counted for by changing economic con-
ditions. Given the striking similarities
between OBRA93 and OBRA90, the
prospects for real deficit reduction, as
well as increased generational equity, crit-
ically depend on whether the supply-side
or extraordinary-factor interpretation of
OBRA90's failure is correct.• Footnotes
1. See David Altig and Jagadeesh Gokhale,
"An Overview of the Clinton Budget Plan,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Eco-
nomic Commentary, March 1, 1993.
2. The generational accounting results re-
ported here are based on Mid-Session Review
of the 1994 Budget, Office of Management
and Budget, September 1993.
3. We present a more detailed discussion of
differences in the CBO and OMB calcula-
tions in our earlier article.
4. OBRA93 specifies spending caps for to-
tal discretionary outlays, but does not indi-
cate separate mandatory limits for defense
and nondefense components. Subject to revi-
sions for economic and technical reasons or
mitigating legislation in Congress, defense
expenditures that are higher than those indi-
cated here would necessarily be met by
lower nondefense outlays.
5. The baseline lifetime tax rates are taken
from Budget Baselines, Historical Data, and
Alternatives for the Future, Office of Man-
agement and Budget, January 1993.
6. The lifetime tax rates presented are the ra-
tios of lifetime net tax payments to lifetime
labor income. Capital gains in excess of the
normal return on saving and net transfers from
other generations are not included in our calcu-
lations because of data limitations. However,
the upward bias in the reported tax rates result-
ing from these omissions is minimal because
these sources of income constitute only a small
fraction of lifetime resources. The lifetime tax
rates reported are population-weighted aver-
ages over male and female generations of the
same age.
7. The smaller tax hikes and greater spend-
ing reductions under OBRA93 result in life-
time tax rates that are marginally lower for
all (living and future) generations relative to
those implied by proposals in Vision.
8. Only changes in tax and transfer payments
are shown. Changes in government purchases
of goods and services are not included in the
analysis. This exercise can be viewed as an an-
swer to the question, "What is the marginal
change in the distribution of the burden of pay-
ing for government purchases?"
9. See Martin Feldstein, "Clinton's Revenue
Mirage," Wall Street Journal, April 6, 1993.
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